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COMMENTS
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
A PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
The right to be represented by counsel is one of the fundamental
safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgement by virtue of the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The right is equally
protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In the federal courts, the right to counsel rests on
the specific language of the Sixth Amendment which states that "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense." 1
In 1932, the Supreme Court recognized that failure of a state court
to appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant, accused of a cap-
ital offense, was a deprivation of due process guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 Ten years later the Court refused to extend the rule
to state non-capital offenses, unless the circumstances of the case were
such that failure to appoint counsel would result in substantial unfairness
to the defendant.- In 1963, the Court reversed its ruling in Betts v.
Brady, and held that refusal of a state court to provide counsel for an
indigent accused of either a capital or non-capital offense was a violation
of due process.4
The purpose of this note is to analyze two related questions left un-
answered by the Gideon decision. The first considers the scope of the
right to counsel as it relates to indigents accused of sub-felony offenses;
while the second examines the correlative right of waiver as may be
guaranteed in State prosecutions.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN SUB-FELONY OFFENSES
In Gideon v. Wainwrigbt5 the Supreme Court ruled that the defend-
ant, who was an indigent accused of a felony in a State Court, had a
1. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. VI. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
2. Powell v. Alabama, 28 U.S. 45 (1932).
3. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. Ibid.
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right to be supplied with legal counsel. However, the question of wheth-
er an indigent, in similar circumstances, charged with a lesser offense is
also entitled to be provided with legal representation remains unan-
swered. Despite the importance of this issue, the probability of the
Supreme Court ever fully defining an indigent's right to counsel is
remote. More than likely, one accused of a lesser offense, unable to
post bond, would have served his sentence thereby causing this issue
to become moot before the Supreme Court could ever hear and rule on
it.
An accused's right to counsel in "all criminal prosecutions" is guaran-
teed by the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution The phrase,
"all criminal prosecutions" is the only limitation imposed on the other-
wise absolute right. Various state courts have defined a criminal prose-
cution as an action or proceeding instituted in a proper court on behalf
of the public, for securing the conviction and punishment of one ac-
cused of a crime.7 If acceptable, this definition suggests that one ac-
cused of a crime has the right to be assisted by counsel and leaves un-
resolved only the question of determining the classes of unlawful acts
within the term "crime". The United States Supreme Court has con-
cluded that the word crime is synonymous with misdemeanor and in-
cludes every offense below felony which is punishable by indictment
as an offense against the public." State courts have generally agreed
that the term "crime" is not limited to felonies but that the latter classi-
fication merely indicates the character of the crime. Both state and fed-
eral courts agree that there is a class of public offenses not within the
scope of "crime"." These, they say, are less serious and are usually
prosecuted summarily.10 Therefore, if the above definition of a criminal
6. U.S. Co s-. AMEND. VI.
7. Harger v. Thomas, 44 Pa. 128, 84 Am. Dec. 422 (1862); Ex parte Pepper, 185 Ala.
284, 64 So. 112, 113 (1913); State v. District Court of Fifth Judicial District, 53 Mont.
350, 165 P. 294, 296 (1917); McGoldrick v. Downs, 184 Misc. 168, 53 N.Y.S.2d 333,
336 (1945).
8. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 76 (1860).
9. People v. Osslo, 310 P.2d 1020, 1029 (Cal. 1957); State v. Murdock, 172 Ohio St.
221, 174 N.E.2d 543, 545 (1961); Starks v. Turner, 365 P.2d 564, 566 (Old. Crim. 1961);
Barsky v. Board of Regents of the University of N. Y., 305 N.Y. 89, 111 N.E.2d 222,
225 (1953); Gultling v. State, 199 Ind. 630, 158 N.E. 593, 594 (1927); Bostic v. U.S,
94 F.2d 636, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1931); State v. District Ct. of First Judicial District, Lewis
and Clark County, 72 Mont. 374, 233 P. 957, 959 (1925); In re Voorhees, 32 NJ.L.
(3 Vroom) 141, 147 (1867); Stone v. City of Paducah, 120 Ky. 322, 86 S.W. 531, 534
(1905); State v. Bletz, 171 Mo. 530, 71 S.W. 1027, 1030 (1903); Lewis v. State, 85 Miss.
35, 37 So. 497 (1904); U.S. v. Flores-Rodrigues, 237 F.2d 405, 407 (2d Cir. 1956).
10. Disorderly conduct is an example, see, People ex rel. Cohen v. Collins, 238 App.
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prosecution is acceptable, the right to counsel should extend to indigents
accused of all but the last mentioned offenses.
The above definition, however, incorrectly assumes that the phrases
"criminal prosecution" and "prosecution for a crime" are synonymous.
In Schick v. U. S.:" the Supreme Court, construing the word "crimes"
as it is used in Article III, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution, referred
to 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 5 which reads:
the general definition comprehends both crimes and misdemeanors;
which properly speaking are synonymous terms; though in common
usage the word crime is made to denote such offenses as of a deeper
more atrocious dye; while smaller faults and omissions of less conse-
quence are comprised under the gentler name of misdemeanor.
The Court then concluded that if the language of Article 1II, Section
2 had included the words "criminal offenses" rather than the word
"crime" it might be made to apply to all offenses of a criminal nature,
petty as well as serious. It is clear then that the reverse of this construc-
tion can be applied to define the words "criminal prosecutions" as they
appear in the Sixth Amendment. If the words "In all prosecutions
for crime" had been used in place of "In all criminal prosecutions" then
the right to counsel guarantee would be limited to all prosecutions for a
crime instead of allowing that right to extend to those accused of of-
fenses of a criminal nature.
Implicit in the above argument is a distinction between two classes of
offenses: those of a criminal nature and those not of a criminal nature.
Offenses that are not within the technical classification of crime may
nevertheless be classified as offenses of a criminal nature, thus broaden-
ing the scope of the right to counsel provision beyond that indicated
by state court constructions of the words "criminal prosecutions".
The Supreme Court, while defining the right to a jury trial indicated
that one accused of an offense that was a crime at common law, and
malum in se, in nature could not be denied that right guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.' 2 Since all of the rights safeguarded by that Amend-
Div. 592, 265 N.Y. Supp. 475 (1933); Zielinski v. Rasmussen, 29 Misc. 2d 70, 217 N.Y.S.2d
834 (1961); U.S. v. Au Young, 142 F. Supp. 666, 667 (1956).
11. 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904).
12. Id. at 67, the Court, classifying the quality of the offense of violating the Oleo-
margarine Act, said, "It is not one necessarily involving any moral delinquency." Also,
see, District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930), where the Court formulated
a test. It said: 'Whether a given offense is to be classed as a crime, so as to require
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ment share the "criminal prosecution" limitation, it follows then that
the above criteria should also apply to the right to counsel provision.
However, Congress ignored the above test by the passage of the Crim-
inal Justice Act of 1964 which, in effect, denies an indigent accused of
a petty offense his right to counsel. . The Act adopted the existing
statutory definition of a petty offense as "any misdemeanor the penalty
for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or
.a fine of not more than $500.00 or both." 14
This arbitrary limitation of the right to counsel ignores the possibility
that offenses within the petty offense category may include mala in se
crimes. In Montana, for instance, petit larceny "is punishable by a fine
not exceeding $500 or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding
six months or both." '- Thus if the Act applied to that State, an indigent
so accused would not be within its right to counsel provision. Further-
more, although the Supreme Court has suggested that petty offenses
are not criminal, it has never ruled that all minor offenses are petty, nor
is such a conclusion correct, despite the implications of the aforemen-
tioned Criminal Justice Act. The offenses thus classified by the Court
as petty, were all of a mala prohibita character and the laws violated
were in the nature of municipal ordinances,' because their function
was to maintain the health, peace and tranquility of the community as
opposed to enforcing the natural law.
Violations of municipal ordinances have been confined to the fol-
lowing:
breaches of by-laws and ordinances which in their nature are mala
prohibita, and which by legislative sanction have been enacted by the
municipality for its health, peace and tranquility, and in this state have
a jury trial, or as a petty offense triable without a jury, depends primarily upon the
nature of the offense."
13. The Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006 A(b) (1964). "In every
criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a felony or a misdemeanor other
than a petty offense, and appears without counsel, the United States Commissioner or
the Court shall advise the defendant that he has the right to be represented by counsel
and that counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is financially unable to obtain
counsel.. !'
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1(c) (1948).
15. MoNrT. REv. CoDE, ch. 94, §§ 2704, 2705, 2707 (1947). Larceny of property valued
at less than $50 is petit.
16. District of Columbia v. Clawons, 300 U.S. 617 (1937), dealing in second-hand
goods without a license; Schick v. U. S., supra note 11, violation of the Oleomargarine
Act punishable by a $50 fine; Natal v. Louisiana, 139 US. 621 (1891), violation of a
city ordinance prohibiting private markets within six miles of public markets.
1966]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
always been prosecuted without a jury. While it may be doubted
that the Legislature may delegate to a municipality the right to declare
certain acts offenses against the corporation and offenders thereof con-
stitutionally subject to a criminal trial, it is very generally held that
the transgression of municipal regulations enacted under the police
power for the purpose of preserving the health, peace and good order,
and otherwise promoting the general welfare within cities and towns,
may be prosecuted without a jury. 17
Consistent with this view, the weight of authority among the states
indicates that the violation of a municipal ordinance, enacted by a city
under legislative authority, is not a crime. 8 Furthermore, the prosecu-
tion of violations of such ordinances are not criminal, but have been
called quasi-criminal insofar as they are subject to the rules of evidence.'9
An indigent accused of a petty malum prohibitum offense is less
likely to be characterized as morally corrupt if convicted than would one
convicted of a malum in se offense entailing a similar punishment. It
has been recently pointed out that because of
the increasing number of public employees in the large number of
employment situations requiring fidelity bonds and other intensive
scrutiny of personal background, the decision of whether the commu-
nity is to provide legal services to the indigent should be based on the
nature of the consequences of conviction rather than on the abstract
legal classification within which the transgressive act happens to find
itself.20
It is the indigent, more than any other class of accused, who most needs
employment and social acceptance, but at present it is he who is most
17. Pearson v. Wimbish, 129 Ga. 701, 52 SE. 751, 753 (1906).
18. Withers v. State, 36 Ala. 252; Williams v. City Counsel of Augusta, 4 Ga. 509
(1848); Wiggins v. City of Chicago, 68 Ill. 372 (1873); Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281 (1842);
State v. Boneil, 42 La.Ann. 1110 (1890); Cooper v. People, 41 Mich. 403, 2 N.W. 51
(1879); State v. Gustin, 157 Mo. 108, 53 S.V. 421 (1899); State v. Rouch, 47 Ohio St.
478. 25 N.E. 59 (1890); State v. Hamley, 137 Wis. 458, 119 N.W. 114 (W09); Courts
holding that the violation of such an ordinance is a crime: Ex Parte Clark, 24 Cal. App.
389, 141 P. 831 (1914); State v. Vail, 57 Iowa 103, 10 N.W. 297 (1881); State v. West,
42 Minn. 147, 43 N.W. 845 (1889); Bautsch v. City of Galveston, 27 Tex. App. 342,
11 S.W. 414 (1889).
19. Barron v. City of Anniston, 157 Ala. 399, 48 So. 58 (1968); Wiggins v. City of
Chicago, 68 Il. 372 (1873); Town of Scranton v. Hansen, 151 Iowa 221, 130 N.W. 1079
(1911); State v. Hamlev, 137 Wis. 458, 119 NAV. 114 (1909).
20. Burzon, The Right to Counsel and the Indigent Accused in Courts of Criminal
Jurisdiction in New York, 14 BUFFALO L. Rr.v. 428, 453 (1965).
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apt to be unjustly convicted of some minor malum in se crime, and
thus suffer the corresponding social disabilities.
Some writers, ignoring the foregoing view, have suggested that the
indigent's right to counsel be limited to those accused of crimes classi-
fied as felonies. However, if that opinion is to be followed the States
will have to resolve some of the confusion existing among them by
arriving at a common classification of felonies and misdemeanor. Most
states agree that a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in a state
penitentiary is a felony and that all other crimes are misdemeanors.
However, a short investigation indicates that the above common stan-
dard should not be mistaken for uniformity. A few years ago, Massa-
chusetts altered the conditions under which a sentence would be served
in the state penitentiary for administrative reasons and by so doing
converted some misdemeanors into felonies.2 ' In New Jersey most
crimes are designated misdemeanors. 2 Some states call reckless
or negligent homicide by automobile a misdemeanor punishable by six
months to one year imprisonment.23 Other states call the same offense
a misdemeanor, but attach a felony penalty of two years and/or $2,000
fine. This disunity among the states clearly demonstrates that a felony-
misdemeanor dichotomy regarding an indigent's right to counsel would
be unworkable without a federal standard defining each class, otherwise
the states through their legislatures would retain control of this consti-
tutional right. The present federal rule is that "any offense punishable
by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year is a felony." 2'
Another criterion was suggested by the Fourth Circuit in Jones v.
Cunningbam.6 It stated:
Henceforth (post Gideon), state criminal courts, as in Federal District
Courts, are under an absolute duty to supply indigent defendants faced
with serious criminal charges, with legal assistance if the defendant
desired it and cannot procure it for himself.
Adoption of this "serious" crime rule would necessitate case-by-case
21. Sutherland and Cressey, Principles of Criminology, 17 (6th ed. 1960).
22. N.J. REV. STAT. 2:14.1 (1937) kidnapping; N.J. REv. STAT. 2:163.1 (1937) forcible
rape; N.J. REv. STAT. 2:166.1 (1937) robbery.
23. Moreland, The Law of Homicide, 246-252 (1952); Rosenfeld, Negligent Homicide,
25 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1936); Robinson, Manslaughter by Motorists, 22 MINN. L. REv.
755 (1938).
24. MicH. Co.m. LAws § 750.324 (1948).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1948).
26. 319 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1963).
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adjudication in order to define the term "serious crime". This would
more than likely require the Supreme Court to review many State
Court decisions and consequently do more harm to the ideal of federal-
ism than would the imposition upon the States by the Federal Gov-
ernment of some pre-defined standards.
Presumptively, the indigent's right to be provided with the assistance
of counsel exists in order to remove the inequities that might accrue
to him because of his economic condition. According to Mr. Justice
Douglas:
[T] he refusal to recognize the right of counsel in every criminal case
has long seemed to me to be a denial of equal protection of the law
... I know of no more invidious discrimination based on poverty.27
The Supreme Court has held that discrimination based on wealth violates
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In Griffin v. Illinois28 the State appellate procedure required the
appellant to purchase a trial transcript in order to get a direct review
of his case. There the Court reasoned that although the Federal Consti-
tution does not require a state to provide appellate review, once a state
does grant such review it cannot discriminate against some by refusing
to allow them an opportunity to appeal solely because of their poverty.
The Court stated: "There can be no equal justice when the kind of trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." 2 The Court ap-
plied similar reasoning in Douglas v. California." There the procedure
allowed the District Court of Appeals to deny indigent appellant's re-
quests for the appointment of counsel if it believed that such appoint-
ments would not be of value to the Court or to the appellant. The Court
stated:
where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has of right
are decided without the benefit of counsel an unconstitutional line has
been drawn between rich and poor...
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment where the rich man who appeals as of right enjoyed the benefit
of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law and
marshalling of arguments in his behalf, while the indigent, already
27. Right to Counsel Symposium, 45 AfxN. L. REv. 693 (1961).
28. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
29. Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 28, at 19.
30. 372 U.S. 352 (1963).
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burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit,
is forced to shift for himself.3'
Both of these cases show little concern over the quality of the offense
for which the poor man had been convicted, but rather center upon the
injustice resulting because of his lack of funds. This reasoning can be
applied to the analogous situation of the indigent at the trial level.'
Aithough a state may not be required to allow a man accused of a minor
crime to retain counsel, once he is granted that right, it would be a
denial of due process not to provide counsel for one similarly accused
who is indigent. When the merits of an indigent's only trial are decided
without the benefit of counsel, an unconstitutional line has been drawn
between rich and poor. Therefore, since the rich man can retain
counsel when accused of any offense then the indigent should be pro-
vided counsel when similarly charged. In Evans v. Reves32 the defend-
ant, charged with refusing to support and maintain his minor child, was
not informed of his right to counsel. The Court, reversing his convic-
tion, stated... "so far as the assistance of counsel is concerned, the Con-
stitution draws no distinction between loss of liberty for a short period
and such a loss for a long one.as
Thus far, Harvey v. Mississipp34 is the only case that has applied the
Gideon rule in a sub-felony crime situation. There an illiterate Negro,
who had been active in civil rights movements, was arrested and charged
with the illegal possession of liquor, a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
of $500.00 and/or ninety days in jail. The defendant was without coun-
sel and pleaded guilty after being assured that he would only be fined.
Instead he was sentenced to the maximum and the mittimus order was.
not issued until the forty day statutory period for appeal had passed.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the indigent's guilty plea was invalid
because he had not been given notice of his right to the assistance of
counsel. It said:
While the rule as thus stated has never been expressly intended to mis-
31. Douglas v. California, supra note 30, at 357,-358.
32. 126 F.2d 633 (1942).
33. Evans v. Reves, supra note 32, at 638. This case has not been followed. In 1960,
the District of Columbia created a system for the appointment of counsel in minor
criminal cases, which unfortunately limited counsel to indigents accused of offenses.
punishable by imprisonment of a year or more. Cellar, Federal Legislative Proposals
to Supply Paid Counsel to Indigent Persons Accused of Crime, 45 Mime. L. REv. 697,
707 (1961).
34. 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cit. 1965).
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demeanor charges in state tribunals, it has been argued that such a prin-
ciple is implicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wain-
wrigbt. Be this as it may, the reasoning in Evans v. Reves along with
other right to counsel decisions persuades us that we should apply that
rule in the present case. 35
At present, those engaging in the right to counsel debate argue two
irreconcilable points of view. One group contends that because the pur-
pose of furnishing counsel to indigents is to reduce the discrepancy
between the rich who can supply their own counsel and the poor who
cannot, counsel should be made available to all indigents.3 6 The other
group simply states that "this new fetish for indigency piles an intoler-
able burden on the States' judicial machinery." 3 Here it is submitted
that this debate be settled by allowing indigents their full rights under
the Sixth Amendment, that is, extending their right to counsel to all
criminal prosecutions. Thus, only in those instances where an indigent
is accused of a petty malum prohibutum offense, one not of a criminal
nature, should he be forced to defend himself without the aid of legal
counsel.
THE CORRELATIVE RIGHT OF WAIVER AS MAY BE APPLIED IN
STATE PROSECUTIONS
The recognition of the right to counsel as one of the fundamental
rights of liberty guaranteed by the United States Constitution, has led
federal courts to make every reasonable presumption against waiver31
In federal prosecutions an accused will not be deemed to have effectively
waived his right to counsel unless the waiver was made voluntarily after
a broad understanding of the whole record.3 9 In Von Moltke v. Gil-
lies,40 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the federal
standard requires that a waiver may not ordinarily be accepted until the
court has determined that the accused understands the nature of the
charge, the elements of the offense, the pleas and defenses available
and the punishment that may be imposed.
While the federal standard clearly requires that the accused under-
stand his peril before an effective waiver will be recognized, it fails to
35. Harvey v. Mississippi, supra note 34, at 271.
36. Judge Anderson, Representation of Defendants, 36 F.R.D. 136, 140 (1965).
37. Douglas v. California, supra note 31, at 359, dissenting opinion.
38. Jobnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942).
39. Glasser v. United States, supra note 38.
40. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
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establish a uniform definition of the understanding required.41 The Su-
preme Court recognizing that a workable criterion could not be promul-
gated which would apply to all situations, held that the question of
effective waiver depends on the particular facts and circumstances of
each case.42 Certain factors which have been held to bear upon the
question are age, mental capacities, and background and experience of
the accused.43 For example, in Glasser v. United States, the defend-
ant was an attorney who was indicted for an alleged conspiracy to
defraud the United States Government. The court held that being
an attorney was immaterial to defendant's right to have counsel ap-
pointed, but considered his professional experience in determining
whether he had effectively waived counsel.
In the federal courts the duty is imposed on the trial judge to protect
the defendant's constitutional guarantee against any presumption of
waiver.4 5 Where the judge concludes that an effective waiver was made,
his determination should appear upon the record.46 The Supreme Court
recognizing the necessity of this requirement stated that where the rec-
ord fails to indicate that accused has intelligently and understandingly
waived his right to counsel, his conviction should be reversed.47
41. U.S. v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Carnley v. Cockran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
Record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which shows, that an
accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer,
and anything else is not a waiver of right to counsel.
42. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 38.
43. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948). Accused who was young and in-
experienced in the intricacies of criminal procedure should not have been permitted
by state court to plead guilty to crimes of burglary which carry a maximum sentence
of 80 years without an offer of the advice of counsel. And where accused was never
advised of his right to c-nsel and no attempt was made by the court to Inake him
understand the consequences of his pleas of guilty accused was not afforded a fair
trial. McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961). Where the gravity of the crime and
other factors such as the age and education of the defendant, the conduct of the
court or the prosecuting officers, and the complicated nature of the offense charged,
and the possible defense render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result
to injustice as to be fundamentally unfair, the Constitution requires that the accused
must have legal assistance at his trial.
44. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 38.
45. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 38.
46. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 38. This protecting duty imposes the serious and
weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an in-
telligent and competent waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive his right
to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial
court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for the determination to appear upon
the record. Carnley v. Cockran, supra note 4.
47. Carnlev v. Cockran, supra note 41.
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The federal standard of protection as laid down by Johnson v. Zerbst"
has been extended to protect a litigant who failed to request counsel.49
The Supreme Court in applying the standard ruled that a waiver shall
not be presumed from the mere failure to request counsel, for where
assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite it cannot be made to
depend on request.50
Prior to Gideon v. Wainwright,51 when the right to counsel was
recognized in state prosecutions, the federal standard of waiver was held
to be applicable.5 2 For example, in Moore v. Michigan,53 the defendant
was a Negro, 17 years of age, with a seventh grade education. He
pleaded guilty to a charge of murder and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment. Before the guilty plea, the court advised the indigent of his right
to counsel but he refused to accept. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States, the conviction was reversed. The Court ruled
that when a person convicted in a state court has not intelligently and
understandingly waived the benefit of counsel and where the circum-
stances show that his rights could not have been fairly protected with-
out counsel, due process invalidates his conviction.
The Gideon decision, while extending the right° to counsel to state
prosecutions, left unanswered the question whether the federal standard
of waiver will be applied in all state criminal prosecutions. The con-
curring opinion of Justice Harlan stated that his "understanding of the
majority opinion does not embrace the concept that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment as such." 5 On the
other hand, Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion stated that "rights
protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment are not watered-down versions of what the Bill of
Rights guaranteed." "
48. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 38.
49. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 38; Carney v. Cockran, supra note 9; MlcNeal v.
Culver, supra note 43. Accused's failure to request counsel does not constitute a waiver
when accused does not know his right to counsel.
50. Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786 (1945). A defendant who pleads guilty is entitled
to the benefit of counsel and a request for counsel is not necessary. It is enough that
a defendant charged with an offense of this character is incapable adequately of making
his defense, that he is unable to get counsel and that he does not intelligently and
understandingly waive counsel.
51. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 4.
52. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, supra note 43; Von Malke v. Gillies. supra note 40;
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
53. 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
54. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 4, at 349.
55. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 4, at 345.
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The nature of the right itself justifies the argument that in futire
cases the federal standard of waiver will be applied with equal force
in state prosecutions. The right to counsel has been recognized as bind-
ing on the state court as a safeguard of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Therefore, to allow a
state court to presume waiver without imposing the federal duty to
protect the right would be giving state courts the power to deny due
process of law at the discretion of each judge. As Justice Douglas clearly
implied, whenever a constitutional right is applicable to both a state and
federal litigant, one is not to receive a lesser version of that right merely
because his action lies in the state court.
The right of an accused to refuse the assistance of counsel and rely
on his own skill was recognized in Carter v. Illinois .t The Supreme
Court ruled that "neither the historic conception of due process nor the
vitality it derives from progressive standards of justice denies a person
the right to defend himself or confess guilt." Furthermore, in Adams v.
United States,58 the court recognized the right to dispense with counsel
to be correlative of the right to the assistance of counsel. It follows
then that if the right to waive counsel is to be recognized as a correlative
of the right to have counsel, protection of the former is as essential to a
fair trial as that of the latter.
This conclusion can be strengthened by looking at the historic trend
of Supreme Court decisions which have applied the federal standard
of waiver in state prosecutions. In cases prior to Powell v. Alabama,9
the methods and practices by which state crimes were prosecuted were
held to be a matter for the individual states, so long as they observed
those ultimate dignities of man which the United States Constitution
assured.60  However, since the Sixth Amendment was not recognized
as binding on the States during that period, the right to counsel and the
standard for protecting the right were not included in the ultimate
dignities of man assured by the United States Consitution. On the other
hand, in cases after the Powell decision, where the right to counsel was
recognized to be applicable in state capital prosecutions, the Supreme
Court imposed the same duty of protecting the right on state courts that
56. Carnley v. Cockran, supra note 41.
57. 329 U.S. 173, 179 (1946).
58. 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942). "The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative
right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on con-
siderations that go to the substance of an accused's position before the law"
59. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
60. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
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had previously been imposed by the Zerbst decision on Federal Courts.6 '
Similarly, in cases after Betts v. Brady,62 where the right to counsel in
state non-capital cases was determined to be applicable only under cer-
tain circumstances, the standard for protecting the right in these cases
was clearly recognized by three Supreme Court decisions to be no less
than that required in federal prosecutions.63 Therefore, it appears that
this historic pattern of case law which recognized waiver to be a correl-
ative of the right to counsel should be followed in state criminal cases
arising subsequent to Gideon.
The Gideon decision may be interpreted to extend the right to coun-
sel to certain pre-trial stages of the proceeding or to all criminal prose-
cutions. However, regardless of how broadly the case is applied, it
would appear that whenever the accused is guaranteed the right to coun-
sel, his correlative right to waive must equally be guaranteed and pro-
tected.
Alan MacDonald
Gus James II
61. Uveges v. Pennsylvania, supra note 43; Von Malke v. Gillies, supra note 40;
Moore v. Michigan, supra note 52.
62. Supra note 3.
63. Carter v. Illinois, supra note 22; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Rice v.
Olsen, supra note 50.
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